

Two Africas? Two Ugandas?

An African 'Democratic Developmental State'? Or another 'failed state'?

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For all practical purposes, the conflict in the region has split Uganda into two countries - the one, the southern Uganda of economic development & growth, and the other, stretching north of Lake Kyoga, a theatre of war for the past two decade (Ajulu 2004: 274).

...neither Africa's post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful 'developmental states' rule out the possibility of African 'developmental states' capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto (Mkandawire 2002: 289).

ABSTRACT

Uganda's impressive return from war to peace in the mid-1980s has been followed by a rapid revival of its economy. The country has enjoyed an average annual growth rate of 6% over the last decade (1993-2003) becoming the fastest growing economy in the region largely due to successful macro-economic stabilisation policies, strong donor support and increased interest from foreign investors (ADB 2004). Poverty rates have also declined¹ and, by 2002, Uganda's HDI & HPI were at 0.444 and 40.8%², respectively.

During the 1990s Uganda registered improvements in its overall human development indicators based on increases in incomes as well as achievements in the social services sectors, especially health and education (UNDP 2003). The rehabilitation of social services and increased use of NGOs, CBOs and the private sector in their delivery, especially healthcare, has improved access to basic services, but the high population growth rate of 3.4% threatens to eliminate all such advances, as indicated by elusive MDGs.

However, such redevelopment over the last decade or two has not been uniformly experienced in terms of the country's different regions and classes, genders & generations. Indeed, even more than in previous decades, as suggested above by Rok Ajulu, 'Uganda' now consists of at least two distinct yet interconnected 'states'³ (or 'economies' (ECA 2003)): the more prosperous central & southern areas of the country, as opposed to the highly insecure & impoverished north. This paper adopts the concept of 'African democratic developmental state' proposed above by Thandika Mkandawire (2001) for Botswana and Mauritius to the case of the south of Uganda (Shaw 2004b). But it also suggests that the continuing alienation and violence in the north constitutes an instance of the regional and global 'responsibility to protect' (ICISS 2001) given the Museveni regime's great reluctance if not unwillingness, still apparent at the start of the new century, to negotiate peace despite its own transition from conflict to reconstruction in the mid-1980s (Barya 2004, Hansen & Twaddle 1998). As Ellen Hauser (1999: 634) has cautioned:

Lack of donor attention to how political problems pose threats to Uganda's economic success has proved to be dangerous both for Uganda's economy and for the possibility of sustainable democracy.

¹ Population living below the poverty line declined from 44% in the mid-1990's to 35% in 2000 (UNDP 2003)

² Uganda's HDI & HPI were estimated to be at miserable levels of 0.2 and 60% respectively when President Museveni came to power in 1986.

³ For instance, Northern Uganda's regional HDI was 0.3 compared to that of 0.52 for Central Uganda, while the HPI was 46.1 and 31.5 for the Northern and Central Regions, respectively, in the year 2000 (UNDP 2003).

A) INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, Uganda has transcended an unenviable two, decade history of decline and trauma to advance reconstruction (Hansen & Twaddle 1998, Museveni 1997) and African (HIPC?) governance. When Uganda achieved independence in 1962 it was one of the most promising countries in Africa. However, twenty years of political strife, economic mismanagement, and armed conflicts left it devastated and much of its physical and social infrastructure destroyed. Uganda's long string of tragedies is legendary. Ten leaders have ruled the country in the four decades since independence, including Idi Amin's 8-year reign of terror where an estimated 500,000 people died. It was not until 1986, when Yoweri Museveni gained power, that relative stability was achieved and it became possible to attempt to rebuild the economy. Museveni introduced a non-party democracy system with the National Resistance Movement, and presidential elections were held in 1996 and 2001.

During the last decade (1992-2002), Uganda has managed to maintain an impressive annual growth rate of 6.4%, largely due to improvements in the policy environment and the restoration of peace in much but not all of the country, making it possible to rehabilitate facilities and increase capacity utilization particularly in the south. Economic growth has also been a result of the increased flow of capital and technology from the private sector involving both local and foreign investors following the economic liberalization of the 1990s (Bigsten & Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001, Collier 1994, Deininger & Okidi, 2002, Hansen & Twaddle 1998, Holmgren et al 2000).

Despite the many advances on the political and economic scene and major developments in various parts of the country, there is still significant instability in some areas (see (E) below especially). The north of the country (in particular, Gulu, Kitgum & Pader Districts) has not benefited from Uganda's good macro-economic performance (ECA 2003, UNDP 2000b, 2002 & 2003). In fact, poverty levels in northern Uganda have risen in the last three years⁴. This is especially so in the rural areas & amongst children. By contrast, the towns of Arua, Gulu, Lira etc have grown considerably as fearful communities exited the increasingly unsafe countryside. The rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been fighting a guerrilla-style war against the Ugandan government in the north since the late-1980s (Van Acker 2004). The fear of rebel attacks has forced an estimated 1.2 million internally displaced people (IDPs) to remain in protected camps in northern Uganda, with restricted access to health services, sanitation and food (IRIN 2003). This armed conflict has led to gross violations of human rights against civilians, destroyed infrastructure, adversely disrupted social service delivery systems, paralysed economic activity and caused social disintegration, thus retarding economic and human development in the north. Despite efforts by government and other actors to meet the needs of these affected areas, significant gaps remain in the provision of protection and delivery of social services to vulnerable

groups⁵. Efforts to create peace and foster reconciliation in the region have not been successful either; rather, insecurity continues to spread terror and hinder development and relief activities (Van Acker 2004).

Four decades after formal independence, then, the Ugandan case illustrates the familiar pattern of a few winners and many losers (Ehrhart & Ayoo 2000, Kappel 2004), yet some gains are more widely distributed than others; for example, cell-phones & UHT milk versus the traumas of HIV/AIDS, IDPs, street children/soldiers and orphans, etc. Meanwhile, fresh produce and forex transfers from diasporas - themselves a relatively 'new' phenomenon around Uganda: a function initially of population dispersal because of Amin-era terror - come to balance traditional 'colonial' commodities as sources of export revenue, augmented by invisible, informal, often illegal, income from the Congo (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004, Prunier 2004). In short, the pattern of human development/rights/security in Uganda is uneven as most analyses indicate, including the invaluable series of five UNDP HDRs for Uganda. Meanwhile, what are the implications for comparative analyses/policies/practices arising from this novel African case of two states within one country (Shaw 2004a & c)?

Today's Uganda(s) may thus constitute a challenging case of a divided society with profound implications for comparative analysis, policy and practice in Africa & elsewhere (Crook 2001, Nhema 2004, Osaghae 2001). This paper juxtaposes analysis of Uganda as an 'African democratic developmental state' in the 'south', following a harrowing quarter-century of 'independence', with that as a 'divided society' in the 'north.' But both conceptual frameworks and existential relationships are interconnected in reality, albeit in complex ways; both also entail organic regional dimensions/relations in East Africa/GLR/Horn. The two Ugandas always coexisted in tenuous ways, but in the new century the division has become wider with profound implications for prospects of development and democracy, human rights and human security in both parts. This paper constitutes an experimental attempt to understand and interrelate both of today's Ugandas in the hope that this case study will throw light on the coexistence of conflict & growth elsewhere on the continent & inform state & non-state policies reflective of the 'responsibility to protect' (Field 2004, ICISS 2001, Nhema 2004).

This paper draws, then, from a variety of interrelated yet all to isolated disciplines & debates - from political science/economy & international relations to African, development & security studies - to which we return at the end in

⁴ Existing household survey data in Uganda on income & poverty trends show that a third of the chronically poor and a disproportionate number of households moving into poverty are in Northern Uganda where the security situation has not permitted growth in incomes (Uganda 2003).

⁵ In the *New Vision* 27th Jan 2004 in the *Women's Vision*... was an article: *A dog's life for mothers in Gulu Protected Camp*. This article highlighted the appalling conditions in the camps: "the Maternal mortality rate is 700 out of 100,000 deliveries (yet national figure is 500), the infant mortality ratio, is 172:1,000 (yet national figure is 88) and Pabbo camp with a population of 60,000 people and an average of 3200 birth per year, had only one midwife.

section f) (Shaw 2004d). It seeks to juxtapose generic concepts like 'civil society' & 'governance' with cases drawn from Africa(s), especially Uganda(s); interestingly, in almost all instances, development & conflict genres exist in splendid isolation. So, in terms of extant literatures, there would appear to be at least two 'Ugandas'. While we concentrate here on the GLR, this paper reflects dichotomous analyses & debates from Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (Villalon & Huxtable 1998). In particular, we juxtapose notions drawn from the overlapping HIPC, African developmental state & NEPAD genres. We also bring in notions of human development/security given their salience in the contemporary continent (Hampson, Hillmer & Molot 2001, UNDP 1994 & 1999) plus the notion of 'responsibility to protect' (ICISS 2001). And we particularly reflect on the elusiveness of peace-building & prospects for reconstruction in today's Uganda – the roles of NGOs & think tanks – given our respective, continuing positions as Visiting Professor & Dean in the burgeoning Faculty of Development Studies, with its new, wired, building, at the new Mbarara University of Science & Technology (MUST) in Western Uganda (www.must.ac.ug).

B) UGANDA IN 2004: CONFLICT VERSUS DEVELOPMENT?

Definitions of/and relations among states, economies and civil societies are everywhere in flux given globalizations, regionalisms, migrations (www.forcedmigration.org), neo-liberalism etc (Maignashca 2003). Yet, as indicated in section (f) below, contemporary texts on government, international relations and/or political science rarely so appreciate (Lemke 2003, Shaw 2004d). Likewise, the post-bipolar 'world community' now consists of some 200 mainly poor, small, weak countries (CGD 2004) but most orthodox studies of 'foreign policy' fail to recognize their tenuousness or vulnerability (Khadiagala & Lyons 2001, World Bank 2002) unlike the state of analysis in the less ominous/global 'world' of the 1960s. Today, only a minority of 'critical' analysts focus on the 'other' side of globalizations: 'resistance' as well as global 'governance' (Maignashca 2003: 5) involving for instance regional & global networks of informal/illegal trade in people & products, mafias/militias, drugs & guns etc (www.forcedmigration.org). Yet the formal governmental regimes of over half the members of the UN and World Bank exert at best a tenuous control over their territories, economies and civil societies (CGD 2004, Fearndon & Laitin 2004, Lemke 2003, Shaw 2004c). Prunier (2004) & Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers (2004) have recently provided detailed, informed histories of the complex economic, ethnic & strategic regional dimensions of Uganda's wars which stretch deep into Congo, Rwanda, Sudan etc: 'new regionalisms' (Soderbaum & Shaw 2003) indeed.

Uganda has undergone a profound policy reform process financed by international donors through "foreign aid"⁶. As a result of sustained inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as development assistance, it has enjoyed sustained economic growth of 6%. This has mainly been evidenced by expansion in construction, manufacturing

(textiles & AGOA, sugar & UHT milk... etc), electricity, communications⁷, water, education and poverty reduction to mention but a few. At a broader level, fiscal discipline has ensured macro-economic stability while liberalization, deregulation and privatization have created a relatively successful new nation, at least in the south. There has, for instance, been increased access to safe water from 49% (1998) to 57% (2000). HIV prevalence had also declined from about 30% in the late-1980s to 6.5% in 2001 and the percentage of the population with health facilities has risen to 49% by 2001 (UNDP, 2002). Furthermore, women's share in parliament rose from 18.6% in 1996 to 26% by 2002⁸. However, the most profound legacy of Museveni's regime is in education. Primary school enrolment has increased from 920,000 pupils in 1997 to 7.2 million in 2002, as a result of universal primary education (UPE). At Makerere University, still one of the most prestigious higher institutions in the country & region, impressive improvements have also been registered. Whereas Makerere's total student population in 1986 was less than 5 000 students (all government sponsored), in 2000 the total student enrolment stood at over 25, 000 (more than a 450% increase in 15 years), now consisting of a few government and many private sponsored students (Kwesiga 2000, Musisi & Muwanga 2003). Alongside this "economic success story", however, lies the precarious situation in northern Uganda, one consequence of a series of incomplete 'transitions' since independence itself (Dicklitch 2000).

Northern Uganda has for a long time experienced conflict without any end in sight (Van Acker 2004). There is the brutal and relentless war between the Uganda government forces and rebels called the LRA, which has been going on since 1986. In addition, Karamojong cattle rustlers and tribesmen have for over four decades been carrying out raids and terrorizing their neighbouring districts in the northern and eastern parts of Uganda. These conflicts have led to gross violations of human rights against civilians, mainly women and children, and have destroyed infrastructure, paralysed economic activity, led to social and cultural breakdown, and disrupted economic and human development in the north of the country. As a result, the northern part remains the poorest with 63% of the population, especially children & rural communities, estimated to be living below the poverty line in 2003.⁹ Moreover, attempts to bring peace to the region have so far failed, which has made it difficult to carry out reconstruction efforts and thus to restore pre-war conditions and levels of service delivery. Education in particular, has been severely affected in northern Uganda due to the destruction of school buildings, looting of books and burning supplies, and the targeted killings and abduction of teachers and children by the LRA. In terms of access of water and sanitation too, the forceful displacement of people from homesteads into the camps has resulted in overcrowding and lack of basic supplies and this has led to health problems among resident populations. The nutrition and health conditions of the conflict areas are also very poor,

⁶ Aid grew from US \$ 228m in 1986 to US \$ 905m in 2000 which has had implications for the increased debt... despite HIPC. Thus, in spite of being forgiven over US \$ 1 billion since 1999, Uganda's debt burden has continued to grow at a rate of US \$ 108m a year, and today stands at US \$ 3.9billion.

⁷ For example, there has been a growth from 50,000 telephone lines in 1995 to over half a million mobile phone subscribers courtesy of Celtel, MTN & UTL (Monitor Newspaper, January 26th 2003).

⁸ The GEM (2000) is at 0.417

especially when compared with the rest of the country. For example, the Infant Mortality Rates (IMRs) are 290, 274 and 274 per 1,000 births for Gulu, Kitgum and Pader respectively, whereas the national average is 8% (cf (f) below).¹⁰

In terms of developmentalism, the Museveni regime has been determinedly pro-market whereas in terms of responding to persistent violence it has been resolutely coercive: no negotiations or amnesty until LRA lays down its arms even where child abductees and soldiers are concerned. Uganda's no- (or one-?!) party regime of the NRM changes the context of both developmentalism and conflict. In the former, the catalytic state role is relatively unencumbered by opposition other than some MPs in parliament, some elements in the media and some institutions in civil society. And in the latter, similarly, the response of the state is relatively unhindered other than national & global human rights groups, some regional pressures from the north, especially religious leaders in civil society in the early-twenty-first century, plus some global concern, including diasporas & INGOs, especially those which are 'faith-based' (HDR 2003 a & b, Van Acker 2004).

The reluctance of the Museveni regime to consider talking peace contrasts with its own accession to power: a liberation army from the bush. Its own extensive, inclusive coalition on seizing power in the mid-1980s (see ICISS Volume II (2001): 61-63 on Tanzania's support for the overthrow of Amin in 1979: early 'responsibility to protect?') (Hansen & Twaddle 1998) can be contrasted to its exclusion of northern demands & opponents as the LRA violence continued into the new century & spread towards the south & east. Why would the Museveni regime deny its own experience with peace-building over the previous decade-and-a-half? And does such reluctance in response to the impoverishment & alienation of the north compromise its embryonic status as a democratic developmental state? Furthermore, if the Ugandan state is itself still unwilling to open peace talks at the Track One level, then Tracks Two/Three may become imperatives, with any preliminary understandings then brought back to the official milieu? In short, a series of incomplete transitions, including ambiguous decolonization, have complicated transitions to successor regimes, including those at the end of the twentieth century & start of the twenty-first (Griffiths & Katalikawe 2003, Kyango-Nsubunga 2004)

Given the resilience of violence in the north, then, can we really characterize Uganda as a 'developmental state' (Bigsten & Kayazzi-Mugerwa 2001, Holmgren et al 2000)? But, likewise, given the character of conflict in the north, can we really characterize such as a 'civil war' (Van Acker 2004)? And can the two halves of the territory exist without the other, especially if we recognize the broader regional dimensions of the conflicts in the Great Lakes/Horn (Prunier 2004, Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004) from IGAD mid-2004 Naivasha talks re southern Sudan & late-2004 international conference on the Great Lakes Region (GLR) as follow-up to Sun City agreement on a roadmap for Congo, treated below? Both of these sets of CBMs involve state & non-state 'Friends'. Moreover, given the particularly horrific character

⁹ Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS, November, 2003). Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), 2002/2003. Report on the Socio-Economic Survey. Entebbe.

of LRA attacks – child abductees/soldiers, mass rapes & use of drugs/girls as incentives – public relations/diplomacy dimensions are quite problematic: ‘new security’ features. Furthermore, can any PRSP under HIPC take such violence into account in terms of moderating & reversing alienation through CBM-type negotiation (Gariyo 2001 & 2002)? And are HIPC & NEPAD compatible, leading to an original framework for an innovative form of local to continental African developmental governance (Parpart & Shaw 2002)? In short, might domestic inflexibility negatively impact prospects of regional & continental human development/security?

We now turn to the global-local dimensions of Uganda as an emerging but fraught (HRW 2003a & b) democratic developmental state, before turning to an analysis of its current HIPC governance & continuing conflict (Shaw 2004 b). Certainly there are limitations to democratization in Uganda, in both state & non-state sectors (Furley 2000, Mugaju & Olaka-Onyango 2000). Conversely, it is more developmental as well as democratic than ever, notwithstanding violence in the north.

GLOBAL

Just as states are highly heterogeneous so likewise are non-state actors. The two non-state ‘corners’ of the ‘governance’ triangle (Commonwealth Foundation 1999: 16) include global corporations & local micro-enterprises along with informal & illegal enterprises as well as formal & legal. Thus it is imperative to recognise that ‘global capitalisms’ are in fact heterogeneous rather than homogeneous: relationships around the governance triangle vary.

Similarly, NGOs vary from familiar global INGOs to very local grassroots organizations (Commonwealth Foundation 1999, Desai 2002). In particular, NGOs can be distinguished in terms of whether they are primarily engaged in policy advocacy as think tanks (Scott & Wilson 2003) or service delivery as subcontractors although most do both in varying proportions. Major INGOs have become increasingly engaged with international agencies in the UN & IFI nexuses in terms of both advocacy & subcontracting (Nelson 2002). And such legal arrangements are matched by illegal transnational networks amongst mafias, militias, private armies etc (Avant 2004, Howe 1998, International Alert 2000, Shearer 1998 a & b, www.forcedmigration.org). Indeed, the former - INGOs & UN - have been instrumental in throwing considerable light on the latter, non-state security formations (eg www.globalwitness.org). As Fearon & Laitin (2004: 13) indicate, with the end of the Cold War, ‘new’ security concerns have proliferated & become dominant even if not all IR scholars are yet prepared to so admit.

‘Global civil society’ is very heterogeneous (Glasius, Kaldor & 2001) with global social movements coming to play increasingly salient yet quite incompatible roles. On the one hand, many contemporary INGOs have been the sources which identify & popularise new global issues, such as ecology, genetic engineering, gender, global warming,

¹⁰ United Nations, Uganda Mid-year Review (May 2003). p.g. 4. New York and Geneva.

international criminal court, landmines, ozone-depletion, small arms etc & now 'blood diamonds' (Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000). These have led to major global coalitions such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) which resulted in the 'Ottawa Process' (Hubert 2000, Tomlin 1998), now replicated in the 'Kimberley Process' to outlaw 'conflict diamonds' (Smillie, Gberie & Hazelton 2000). But they have also advanced 'anti-globalization' sentiments as reflected in the 'battle of Seattle' against the MAI & subsequent alternative summits & counter-demonstrations at major global & regional summits (www.attac.org, www.nologo.org) notwithstanding the disruption or diversion of 9/11 (Glasius, Kaldor & Anheier 2002).

In turn, as indicated in section (c) below, major global corporations increasingly seek to insulate themselves from popular pressures/boycotts through a variety of strategies: from association with the UN Global Compact to corporate codes of conduct, ethical as well as fair trade initiatives, strategic alliances with certain IOs or NGOs etc (Shaw & van der Westhuizen 2004). So many of the MNCs which feature in Naomi Klein's No Logo (2000) in terms of being targets of anti-corporate campaigns - eg McDonald's, Nestle, Nike, Shell, Coca-Cola etc - are most active in the UN Global Compact (www.unglobalcompact.org, Parpart & Shaw 2002)! Thus the Coca-Cola company in Uganda has been involved in a variety of community development projects including building schools and health centres, arguably due to such pressure. Meanwhile, given its HIPC & anti-terrorist credentials (NB visit of #2 in the US Air Force in Europe to Gulu & Kampala in July 2004), Uganda is becoming a major beneficiary of the US African Growth & Opportunity Act (AGOA) (www.agoa.gov): some US\$ 6 investment in the early-2000s leading to the revival of the Jinja textile industry, establishment of the Tri-Star apparel factory¹¹ & a rapid rise in cotton (& processed coffee for the first time ever ex-Uganda) exports in 2003: from US\$32 000 in 2002 to \$1.5 million in 2003.

One novel aspect of South-North trade in the new global political economy is 'supply chains' (Mbabazi 2004) which link local producers to global markets in novel ways in a variety of sectors, including 'new' horticulture etc, in a distinctive form of 'partnership' (Nadvi 2004). Typically these link producers of fresh flowers (Asea & Kaija 2000), fruits & vegetables, fish etc to major supermarket chains & use IT for communication & airfreight/containers for transportation. These in turn are open to pressure from advocacy groups over ecology, gender, labour etc, leading to Ethical Trade Initiatives (www.eti.org.uk) & Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (www.publishwhatyoupay.org) as well as Fair Trade, conditionalities over gender, housing & labour practices etc, as is apparent in thumb-print sketches of sources of specialized coffee beans in Aroma, Costa, Second Cup, Starbucks: 'chain governance' (www.gapresearch.org). One of us has produced a doctoral thesis – the first in the Faculty of Development Studies at MUST! - on internal supply chains around a national sector: milk (Mbabazi 2004).

¹¹ The Tri-Star factory, based in Bugolobi, a few kilometres from the heart of Uganda's capital city, Kampala, is headed by a Sri Lankan businessman, Veluppilai Kananathan. About 3000 young women have so far been recruited and trained on the job in various areas of specialisation like hemming skirts, stitching pockets or attaching buttons.

CONTINENTAL

The first few examples of developmental states were authoritarian. The new ones will have to be democratic, and it is encouraging that the two most cited examples of such 'democratic developmental states' are both African - Botswana & Mauritius. (Mkandawire 2001: 310)

Inter- & non-state relations in Africa are changing at the turn of the century (Khadiagala & Lyons 2001) because of globalization/neo-liberalism extra-continentially but also because of new threats/leaders intra-continentially, now advocated in terms of an 'African Renaissance' - from African Union & African Economic Community to New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (www.dfa.gov.za) with its ambitious & controversial African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) - & resonance within the G8 community - Africa Action Plan (MacLean, Harker & Shaw 2002) - (www.g8.gc.ca), reinforced by bilateral Blair (see below) 'initiative' for the continent, with the former now animating a comprehensive Commission for Africa in the run-up to the UK's chairing of both G8 & EU in 2005. These may inform & legitimise regional peace-keeping responses - 'responsibility to protect' - to resilient regional conflicts. And they might even facilitate, perhaps unintentionally, non-state definitions of 'new' regionalisms such as ecology, ethnicity, brands, religions, sports etc (Parpart & Shaw 2002). They may extend legitimacy to new African developmental states & their related NEPAD ideology (Taylor & Nel 2002).

Similarly, given its recent espousal of 'human security', countries like Canada (as indicated below, now Co-Chair of the Friends of the GLR) commit more resources to the continent than 'national interest' alone would justify, in part because of notions of 'human security' & in part given concerned diasporas. As Chris Brown (2001: 194) suggested, at the turn of the century:

As a continent where human security is manifestly at risk, Africa came to figure more prominently in Canada's foreign policy during 2000 than a narrow examination of national interests might suggest.

Furthermore, in follow-up to the April Sun City agreement, the GLR will receive further attention in the run-up to the planned November 2004 international conference in Tanzania, being preceded by national consultations in the seven participating countries, including Uganda, where a civil society consultation was facilitated in August 2004. This ongoing initiative, intended to advance & reinforce the national process of preparing for elections in Congo in 2006, is supported by 28 state & 10 inter-state 'Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region' which is co-chaired by Canada & the Netherlands, who are already connected in the Human Security Network (www.humansecurity.gc.ca). But the protracted history of complex conflicts in Congo & incomplete transitions throughout the region should give pause (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004) about obstacles to be overcome. Likewise, even if Dafour constitutes a further setback for regional peace, the conclusion of IGAD's Naivasha talks gives cause for hope that the southern Sudan dimension of Uganda's

conflict might finally be in transition away from decades of conflict (Prunier 2004). Hopefully some of the lessons learned by UDN *et al* from the HIPC/PRSP (Gariyo 2001 & 2002) could be adapted to the war in the north given the 'responsibility to protect' (ICISS 2001) (see below): a second wind for Tracks Two & Three?

NATIONAL

Patterns of 'governance' in Africa - increasingly inseparable from the notion of a democratic developmental state - are in flux at all levels – local to continental - & all sectors – from state & corporate to non-governmental organisations (NGOs); ie the three 'corners' of the governance 'triangle'. Contemporary notions of governance have a variety of conceptual, ideological, institutional, political & theoretical sources & correlates (Quadir, MacLean & Shaw 2001). Governance on this continent as others varies over time & between regions (Reinikka & Collier 2001, Shaw & Nyang'oro 2000). And it reveals similarities & dissimilarities with other continents: how democratic in Uganda as elsewhere given tensions amongst state & non-state actors (Furley 2000). As elsewhere, notions of comparative politics/development have evolved profoundly over the last decade as the mix of 'globalizations' & 'liberalizations' have impacted in cumulative ways. The focus on state has been superseded by recognition of diverse & changeable patterns of governance reflected in concepts like public-private partnerships, networks, coalitions etc (see, for example, www.copenhagencentre.org, www.unglobalcompact.org) (Mbabazi, MacLean & Shaw 2002).

The debate continues over whether 'globalization' does offer some opportunities for some African states, civil societies & companies at all levels, with the more optimistic 'liberals' insisting that it does, despite all the negative evidence & press over the last two decades (Reinikka & Collier 2001) Coinciding with some promising developments then are moves away from orthodox structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) & conditionalities towards poverty-reduction programmes through HIPC. To qualify, African regimes have had to meet SAP then HIPC terms & design acceptable poverty reduction strategies in association with civil society.

In the case of Uganda, one of relatively few currently successful HIPC cases, in the late-1990s the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) acted as an intermediary between state & private sector on the one hand & civil society on the other at both design & implementation stages, moving from policy advocate to policy agent or subcontractor, achieving the status of an authoritative epistemic community' (Callaghy 2002). As UNCTAD (2003: 148) indicated in a 'box' (#7) on the Uganda case, the latter's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was founded on four pillars:

i) creating a framework for economic growth & transformation; ii) ensuring good governance & security; iii) directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise their income; & iv) directly increasing the quality of life of the poor.

Thus Uganda is something of a model in terms of designing a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) & then maintaining momentum through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in collaboration with a wide network of ministries, international organisations & NGOs, both local & global.

If SAPs generated much scepticism even defeatism on the continent, then their *de facto* successor, offering a distinctive form of globalization - negotiated debt relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) (Anena 2001, Gariyo 2001 & 2002, www.udn.or.ug) - is leading to a novel form of governance. As Callaghy (2002: 138 & 142) suggests:

...all HIPC debt relief is now to be tied directly to poverty reduction. This is to be ensured by the creation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) put together by debtor countries in consultation with civil society groups...If seriously implemented, this new process could be an important change in international governance on debt, aid & development more generally & may have major implications for the unfolding of democratization processes in Africa & elsewhere.

The UDN continued to grow & increase its capabilities. By 2000 it had more than sixty members as well as strong ties to the Uganda Joint Christian Council & business, student & labour organizations...it was becoming very active in coordinating civil society participation in the PRSP process, which it was doing with the help of Northern NGOs. Lastly, it had improved its own organizational capabilities & was running its own independent website.

In the process of so negotiating & facilitating HIPC governance, the UDN has itself been somewhat transformed not only in status, but also in practice - not just advocacy but also delivery – raising issues about cooptation etc (Nelson 2002).

Given the influential role which the donors play in today's Uganda, there may be a danger in them tending to divide NGOs into delivery or advocacy types yet both varieties are needed to make governance more efficacious & accountable (Lister & Nyamugasira 2003). Moreover, there may be a danger in privileging civil society overly to the detriment of formal, multi-party politics: civil society, especially when legitimated or reinforced by global donors/media, can 'squeeze out' other democratic processes like elections?

The distinctively 'Ugandan' debate about Movement versus multiparty politics (Furley 2000, Mugaju & Oloka-Onyango 2000) is not separable from the parallel discourse about occasional formal elections versus continuous civil society activity/advocacy let alone continued advocacy of some form of 'federalism' notwithstanding its chequered history in the country. These combined with the fraught issue of a third term for President Museveni have led to a problematic period in the mid-decade: can Uganda finally transcend a set of complete transitions?

Certainly, redevelopment has not been evenly distributed across Uganda as indicated in the next section: the north (61% support for multiparty politics) remains more impoverished & alienated than the south (39% support for multiparty politics in the West) as reflected in opinion polls as well as support for opposition parties & guerrilla movements (Sunday Monitor, 3 February 2002). Conversely, Museveni gets most support for his handling of the political debate from the West (52%) & least from the North (30%). In short, there are profound limits to 'democracy' even in today's Uganda (Furley 2000)...yet, notwithstanding the violence in the North, these may be excused or disregarded in relation to 'developmental' success; ie the trade-off between economic & political 'liberalizations'?

Finally, to conclude this section, Kevin Dunn (2001: 46 & 49) has chided orthodox analysts about their increasingly outdated & inappropriate analytic approaches which reveal a lack of nuanced understanding of distinctive patterns of dynamic, mixed-actor governance on the continent especially in 'divided' territories like Uganda:

Just a few of the labels attached to the African state over the past decade or so include 'failed', 'lame', 'fictive', 'weak', 'collapsing', 'quasi', 'invented' & 'imposed', 'shadow', 'overdeveloped' & 'centralized', 'swollen', 'soft', 'extractive' & 'parasitic', premodern', & 'post-state'...What needs to be recognized is that the African state is not failing as much as is our understanding of the state.

LOCAL

Finally, then, given decentralization & urbanization, the local level of governance – city & community - is of growing importance for human development/security. It reveals similar patterns of partnership to the other levels; ie increasing roles of non-state actors in terms of service delivery, confidence-building etc as well as in conflict amelioration (Crook 2001) with dramatic contrasts between north & south as already indicated & advanced further below when Gulu is contrasted to Mbarara. As we see in the case of HIV/AIDS below in the Box, subcontracting to local NGOs for AIDS awareness and care like hospices etc (and also local NGOs for education) has become commonplace, increasingly replicated in conflict zones.

Furthermore, over the last decade there has been cumulative positive growth in Western Uganda, albeit from a very weak base post-Amin/Obote II regimes. This has advanced both human development & human security. The former is defined by the UNDP (1994: 13) as expanding human capabilities & choices whilst minimizing vulnerabilities & the latter (UNDP 1994: 24) as *'freedom from fear & freedom from want': human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life & dignity'* (UNDP 1994: 22). We turn to an overview of human development/security in two very different districts/parts of Uganda: Mbarara & Gulu.

NGOs AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN UGANDA

(I)NGOs, national & local NGOs, faith-based groups & CBOs, and households have played a crucial role in Uganda's HIV/AIDS efforts. Community-level responses have been essential in a variety of initiatives, including home-based care, support for orphans and vulnerable children, and HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation. Much of this work has been carried out through community-based and religious organizations. By 1997, there were at least 1,020 NGOs and CBOs involved in HIV/AIDS work in Uganda (World Bank 2000). In September 2003, Dr. Alex Coutinho, Executive Director of TASO, noted that there were 2,500 NGOs working on HIV/AIDS in Uganda. Civil society was providing 90 percent of posttest counseling and care. Seventy percent of Ugandans on Anti-Retroviral Drug Treatments (ART) were receiving treatment services from the Joint Clinical Research Center. NGOs and CBOs were also providing nutritional supplementation to 35,000 persons living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).

One of the key players in the response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda has been TASO, established in 1986. TASO provides care and support to approximately 60,000 AIDS patients and their families, as well as support to over 1,000 orphans. TASO was the first indigenous AIDS organization in Africa and now serves as a global role model. With seven centers across Uganda, TASO continues to play a major role in AIDS care, education, and support. Among its many projects, it is working with the World Food Program to provide food aid support to families affected by HIV/AIDS. Other key organizations include the Uganda Network of AIDS Service Organizations, National Forum of PLWHA Networks in Uganda, National Guidance and Empowerment Network of PLWHA in Uganda, AIDS Information Center, Hospice Uganda, National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS, Uganda Youth Anti-AIDS Association, and Uganda Women's Effort to Save Orphans (see <http://www.unaso.or.ug/members.php>).

Mbarara District, for example, which is one of 45 districts located in the south-western region of Uganda, has enjoyed an annual growth rate of about 6.5% per annum over the recent past (Facts Sheet on Basic Development Indicators: 2000)¹². By most developmental parameters, it compares very favourably with other districts in the country. For example, the maternal mortality rate is 506 per 100,000 live births, infant mortality rate is 120/1000 per 1000 live births, antenatal care (ANC) attendance rate is at least 50%, delivery by trained staff is 14 %, rural safe water coverage is 29% (1999), the number of households with latrines is 72% (1999) while the percentage of population within 5 km of a health unit is 56%. Although the major economic activity in the district is farming, the District also has a number of small-scale industries in the private sector, which include: milk cooling plants, a nail and iron bars factory, hotels & bars, bakeries, carpentries and garages which offer minimal job opportunities to the local population. There is also a soda factory for Coke products and a well-established state university¹³. In terms of infrastructure, the district seems to be doing well too, with 21 sub-counties having access to electricity which only 6 sub-counties lack. With regards to education, the adult literacy rate is relatively high at 52.6% (as compared to the national average of (50%), and school enrolment for UPE children stands at 271,611. However, if we turn to look at the situation in Gulu District in northern Uganda, we get a very different picture.

So, by contrast, the ongoing war has turned Gulu District, once a highly productive area as the major source of cotton for the textile industry at home & abroad, into one of the poorest in the country (cf previous section). Today, little of the money in Gulu town itself is generated locally. Reflective of the 'political economy of conflict' perspective (Collier 1994, Reno 2002), it comes from the army, the NGO community, central government, donors and the extensive Acholi

¹² Some critics have contended that this development is largely a result of state patronage, considering that the NRM ruling elite to a large extent originates from Mbarara District.

diaspora which is said to fund much of the construction in the town. The escalation of the conflict since June 2003 has meant that hundreds of thousands of people have poured into camps after fleeing direct attacks by the rebel LRA and regular fighting between the warring parties¹⁴. The largest IDP camps in the north are located in Gulu District. The displacements and volatile security situation have severely impeded the majority of the IDPs' access to farmland and hence reduced significantly the general food security situation. This has further exacerbated the appalling humanitarian conditions in the camps. The contrasts between Mbarara & Gulu Districts both symbolise & reinforce the division of the country into two.

Furthermore, nutrition surveys indicate that malnutrition is more prevalent among displaced children than among the underage population at large, although throughout the country, rural children are poorer than urban. Malnutrition rates increase significantly when WFP reduces rations to the camps because of shortages of food deliveries (WFP, 2003). A large number of public health units have been closed down, health workers have moved to safer areas, and expectant mothers are not attended to adequately. Diseases like malaria and acute respiratory infections are widespread, claiming the lives of many people in both the District and the north in general (WFP, 2003). In the congested camps, particularly in Gulu, each person receives an average of three litres of safe water as opposed to the recommended 20 litres. This congestion, coupled with an acute shortage of latrines - there is one latrine for every 145 people in some camps - has made the sanitation problems in them even more severe. Undoubtedly, poor health among the displaced population has been aggravated by the congested camps and the breakdown of social structures¹⁵; fertile breeding ground for alienation, sympathy for the 'rebels' etc.

There are also difficulties in introducing free primary education due to the problems of displacement. Few, if any, of the school infrastructures were designed to cope with the influx of displaced pupils. Also, because of the displacements of teachers, students and schools, funds allocated under the UPE scheme do not reach their destination. The result is a recurrent lack of school materials, an acute shortage of teachers, and an increase in pupil-to-classroom ratio. The pupil:classroom ratio has thus increased from 112:1 in the mid 1990s to approximately 234:1 today in some schools in Gulu District (WFP, 2003). On the whole, then, conflict and displacement in Gulu have undermined progress and society & economy there continue to regress.

The glaring contrasts between Mbarara & Gulu Districts at the local level reinforce the division of the country into two distinct, divergent parts at the national level, with serious regional dimensions & reverberations (Prunier 2004, Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004). Such highly uneven development poses profound challenges for policy as well as analysis: can human development/security be advanced & sustained in the south if it is so elusive in the north (Van

¹³ See <http://www.ugandadish.org/mbarara.doc> (Accessed May-2004)

¹⁴ See: <http://www.db.idpproject.org/sites/idpsurvey.nsf/wviewsingleEnv/ugandaprofile+summary> (Accessed May 2004)

Acker 2004)? Does the 'responsibility to protect' in the north limit the prospects of a 'democratic developmental state' in the south? And are the two parts of Uganda really so separate or interrelated, even interdependent? We turn to some consequences in terms of liberalization & privatization before pursuing a case study of northern Uganda.

c) CIVIL SOCIETY, THE STATE & THE ECONOMY IN CONTEMPORARY UGANDA: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION & PRIVATISATION

At the start of the twenty-first century as noted above, NGOs are now engaged in service delivery¹⁶ and/or policy advocacy from local to global levels (Desai 2002, Lister & Nyamugasa 2003, Nelson 2002) leading to 'partnerships' of multiple types which impact the state, whether it seeks such links or not: *'NGOs create alliances & networks to place pressure on the state'* (Desai 2002: 497).

However, one side of the governance 'triangle' (Commonwealth Foundation 1999) - that between the state & civil society - is focused on democratisation or 'political liberalisation'. By contrast, the other side - that between the state & private sector' - is preoccupied with 'economic liberalisation' or privatisation. In such a fluid context, the roles of 'think tanks' as well as NGOs (eg spectrum in Uganda from Private Sector Foundation & Economic Policy Research Centre (see more below) to Centre for Basic Research (CBR) & UDN versus 'old', more established 'academic' research institutions like the Makerere Institute for Social Research (MISR) at Makerere University), are in flux, as indicated in the broad-based (winning?) coalition supporting the PRSP process (UNCTAD 2003). Symbolically, a new project of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations' Conflict Research Unit on 'Democratic Transition in Post-Conflict Societies: building local institutions', which has Uganda as one of its eight case studies, has been collaborating with CBR (www.clingendael.nl/cru/project) (Barya 2004).

HIV/AIDS has also led to innovative civil society-state/corporate partnerships in Uganda as elsewhere on the continent as noted above (see section (including Box) on local level above). NGOs and private companies have been active in financing hospices for the dying, prevention campaigns, orphanages for children without parents etc; & MNCs are increasingly active in terms of infected workers (www.businessfightsaids.org). Hospice Uganda has received sizeable donations from local corporate bodies such as MTN, Standard Chartered Bank (U) and Roko Construction among others. The stand-off between civil society & the state over HIV/AIDS in South Africa is not replicated in Uganda (www.tac.org.za) as the Museveni regime has been in the vanguard of straightforward communication/education, leading to the regional Great Lakes Initiative for AIDS. No wonder Uganda's 'ABC' AIDS prevention policies - Abstinence, Being faithful to your partner and using a Condom - have become something of a model all over the world

¹⁵ See HRW 2003b (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0703/>).

¹⁶ Even in northern Uganda, it is the NGOs that are largely responsible for providing assistance to internally displaced persons, such as health care & food, and trying to maintain the infrastructure.

including the United States (http://www.unesco.org/hiv/IATT_Education/AIDS-Ed_3-5-03_Murphy.ppt), as indicated by Museveni's appearance at the World AIDS conference in Bangkok in July 2004.

'African capitalism' (Shaw & van der Westhuizen 2004) in contemporary Uganda is quite distinctive & different from that elsewhere even if not all analysis so appreciates. It includes not only traditional & contemporary 'colonial' commodities & supply chains but also informal (& illegal?) & formal regional exchanges. It thus now includes fruit, horticultural & vegetable global exports as well as coffee & tea; and to the region it includes electricity, Coca Cola, Mukwano soap products, UHT milk (Mbabazi 2004) etc. Uganda's earnings from fish exports, for instance, have risen from US \$ 18.6 million in 1999 to approximately US \$ 90 million in 2002 (Uganda 2003).

Today's Uganda also includes the burgeoning remittance economy of foreign exchange being sent home either for subsistence or investment by diasporas in Britain, Canada, South Africa etc, typically via Western Union or MoneyGram¹⁷. And in addition to serving as an entrepot for Central African resources, it also serves as a conduit for informal coltan, diamonds & gold out & guns & other basic needs in. The mix of legal & illegal is problematic & controversial, with the UN contributing to both data & debates. Yet clearly, the Ugandan economy as a whole as well as a few individuals in particular have at times gained from the Congolese conflict/expeditionary force (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004).

In addition, the termination of apartheid has enabled South African capital, franchises, links, technologies etc to enter Uganda as elsewhere in Africa, so competing with local (African & Asian), British/European & Asian capitals: Century Bottlers' Coca Cola franchise, MTN cell-phones (www.mtn.co.za), MNet cable & satellite TV (www.multichoice.co.za), Nandos & Steer fast food franchises, Woolworths upmarket shopping (two branches in the 'new' Kampala) (www.woolworths.co.za), Shoprite supermarket also with two branches (www.shoprite.co.za), Metro Cash-& Carry wholesaling, South African Breweries(SAB)/Miller & a new Game superstore recently opened in Lugogo at the start of the Jinja Road.

Such alternatives lead towards new opportunities & to 'new regionalisms': beyond established inter-state East African Community (EAC), now augmented by East African Legislature & onto new security provisions, & Great Lakes Region (GLR) & Lake Victoria basin to flexible non-state forms of regionalisms defined by ecologies, ethnicities, infrastructures, technologies, viruses etc. The division of the country is both impacted by & also affects the range of Uganda's formal &

¹⁷ The second largest source of foreign exchange in Uganda for the last two years has been remittances of Ugandans living abroad, a condition that has set the government thinking of ways in which to send/encourage more Ugandans to go aboard for 'Kyeyo' (manual/odd jobs).

informal regional relations (Prunier 2004, Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004), especially when the informal or new dimensions are included: does the 'border' between the two 'Africas' pass through the middle of Uganda?

We now turn to look more specifically at the less positive, more distressing, case of northern Uganda, with its own 'new regionalisms' dimensions & dynamics

E) THE CASE OF NORTHERN UGANDA

In northern Uganda, living conditions remain critical, especially for the rural & youthful poor. Conditions are characterised by widespread poverty and food insecurity (see Table 1 below). The two-decade long LRA rebellion led by Joseph Kony continues to pose one of the very big challenges to Uganda's economic, social and political development (Van Acker 2004), symbolising & exacerbating the alienation of some/many in Acholiland in particular. The rebellion has caused untold suffering to innocent civilians through indiscriminate killings, rape, abductions of children, who are forcefully conscripted into rebel ranks, and massive displacement of people. There are currently over 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northern Uganda (see Map 1). Many people have been displaced, hundreds killed and over 10,000 children abducted (Boas 2004, FEWS NET/Uganda, May 2004).


The traditional 'geographic' or 'ecological' region of northern Uganda covers the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. However, the 'political' definition of northern Uganda now includes all those districts that have suffered under armed conflicts, and therefore includes nine more districts: Apach and Lira in Lango sub-region; Moyo and Adjumani in Madi sub-region; Arua, Yumbe and Nebbi in West Nile sub-region; and Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit in Karamoja sub-region (Nannyonjo 2004). It also includes the five districts in Teso sub-region (Katakwi, Kaberamaido, Soroti, Kumi, and Pallisa), which have also been affected by the war in many respects. Thus, northern Uganda can be taken to include 18 districts though it is essentially Gulu, Kitgum and Pader in Acholi, Lira and Apac in Lango, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit in Karamoja that have been most affected and devastated by the long-standing armed conflict (see map).

People in the region are mainly confined to IDP camps and currently depend on the food aid provided by the international community and local NGOs. The main victims of the LRA have been the Acholi people from the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader though, as noted above, neighboring districts have also borne the brunt of the war. More than one million Acholi have moved into protected camps. As a result, there has not been much cultivation and hunger is widespread. Having suffered for so many years, Acholi leaders are desperate for peace and have been at the forefront of efforts to open up a dialogue with the rebels (Refugee Law Project 2004) even if the Museveni regime remains resistant, asserting that the LRA is almost defeated so reconstruction &

reconciliation, including treatment for traumas on both/all sides, can commence? In August 2004, an ICC delegation arrived to pursue the Ugandan regime's complaint re LRA 's HR abuses. Figure 1 is a map of northern Uganda showing the main districts affected by the war.

The conflict in northern Uganda has led to gross human right violations, retarded economic activity and social development, so northern Uganda now lags behind the rest of the country in terms of human development as well as human security.

Map 1. The northern Uganda Districts mostly affected by the LRA with IDP numbers



Source of data: WFP Uganda and Uganda Bureau of Statistics

As a result, the Human Development Index (HDI) for northern Uganda in 2001 was 0.350, which is much lower than the national average of 0.449 and that for other regions such as Central (0.552) and Western (0.45). It is the northern region districts of Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Kotido districts, which recorded the lowest levels of human progress at 0.184, 0.184 and 0.195, when compared to other regions in the country.¹⁸ The northern region, reflective of the more rural, youthful characteristics of the poor, currently has the highest incidence of poverty at 63%, compared to national averages of 39.0% and 22.3 %, 46.0% and 32.9% for the central, east and western regions, respectively (Table 2).¹⁹ According to Justine Nannyonjo (2004) insecurity is the major cause of poverty in most of the districts in Northern Uganda & hence a primary reason for acquiescence in or support for the LRA (Boas 2004, Prunier 2004).

¹⁸ See UNDP 2002: 126

¹⁹ The data is based on the statistical definition of northern Uganda as consisting of 13 districts only.

Table 1: Poverty and Human Development Statistics for Uganda 2002/2003

Location	Population Share	Human Development Index	Poverty Indicator PO Headcount	Mean Consumption per Adult Equivalent (CPAE)
National	100.0	0.44	38.8	35,736
Central	29.6	0.55	22.3	52,747
East	27.4	0.44	46.0	28,483
West	24.7	0.45	32.9	33,818
North	18.2	0.34	63.0	21,615

1/ Excludes Pader District in the North.

2/ PO is defined as the percentage of individuals estimated to be living in households with real private consumption per adult equivalent below the poverty line for their region.

Source: UBOS (November 2003). Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), 2002/2003 & UNDP Uganda Human Development Report 2002.

The reasons for the LRA rebellion in northern Uganda have never been clear since it lacks an articulate political leadership to express its grievances though amongst its causes are historic regional alienation & desertion by demobilised soldiers from previous regimes. It is also an indication of incomplete transitions between earlier regimes, especially the take-over by Museveni's NRM (cf Kyango-Nsubunga 2004). As noted above, the war has turned much of the north, once known as the breadbasket of Uganda, into one of the poorest regions in the country. Since the outbreak of the war, an estimated three-quarters of the population have fled the hinterland into IDP camps near towns in fear of rebel attacks. The number of IDPs in northern Uganda has more than doubled from about 650,000 in July 2002 to 1.4 million as of December 2003.²⁰ But if the mix of hard-line in the Sudan & generosity to returnees works then the number of IDPs may begin to decline.

The LRA is headed in part by members of the previous national army that was defeated by the Museveni-led National Resistance Army in 1988 (see next section e)) (Prunier 2004, Van Acker 2004). Although the LRA's wider political agenda is unclear, its immediate objectives seem to be the overthrow of the current government and the dismantling of the IDP camps. The LRA reportedly consists of more than 80 per cent abducted children, many of whom have been converted in the most brutal ways to become extremely violent fighters. The rebels force abducted children to kill and watch beatings, rape and the slaughtering of friends and relatives (Gersony 1997, Pain 1997). Disobedience is likely to

²⁰ See: <http://www.db.idpproject.org/sites/idpsurvey.nsf/wviewsingleEnv/ugandaprofile+summary> (Accessed May 2004)

result in them falling victim to the same fate. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1986, a total of more than 20,000 children have been abducted. Some 4,500 were reportedly fighting for the LRA as of July 2003 (HRW 2003b: 21).

There is little evident will on either side - government or the rebels - to end the conflict peacefully. The government appears to be encouraged in its strategy to pursue a 'military solution' by considerable assistance from the United States, which is provided in exchange for Ugandan support for the fight against international terrorism. (OPM, November 2003; UN OCHA, 2004). Despite some half-hearted attempts in the new century, mostly involving some international - inter- or non-state - pressure, to open dialogue with the LRA for a negotiated peace, the Ugandan government has consistently chosen to confront the problem in the north by military means. Any attempt at kick-starting a peace process is further complicated by an apparent lack of will on the part of the rebels to engage in serious talks, as well as mutual mistrust on both sides (HURIPEC, 30 October 2003, p. 121; IRIN, 22 April 2003). Confidence-building measures would be required, probably initially at the non-state level of Tracks Two & Three. But the core of the NRM regime around Museveni has its roots in a guerrilla war & so prefers fighting to talking. Following the repeated failures to settle the conflict locally & nationally, domestic and international NGOs like Acholi Peace Forum, Kacoke Medit, and ABETO among others have called for urgent international mediation (HURIPEC, 30 October 2003, pp 144-145). But so far they have failed to assemble broad winning coalitions of non- as well as inter-state actors, such as those mobilized for the Ottawa & Kimberley Processes around landmines & conflict diamonds, respectively.

The impact of the LRA has undoubtedly been horrific. The failure by the NRM government to end the war in the north through either negotiations &/or force has translated into frustration and resentment towards it, as revealed by the limited support that Museveni received in the region during the last elections as indicated at p 11 above. Symptomatically, most of the members of the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO) - a pressure group in parliament against the "third term project" of President Museveni, now part of the (new) Forum for Democratic Change coalition - are legislators from the north: another indicator of a divided country. In turn, as the Naivasha talks yield some positive outcomes, violence in Dafour intensifies; the LRA as well as UPDF has a military strategy (see next section).

The recruitment & deployment of local militias also poses a potential threat to Uganda's future stability. Following the LRA's most recent attacks in 2003/2004 further south & east in Soroti and Teso, and the UPDF's apparent inability to cope with these incursions, three groups of local militias, based on previously demobilised soldiers - namely the Arrow Boys, Amuka Boys and the Rhino Boys - were formed with government support to mobilise the local population against rebels in these areas²¹. Although this rapid deployment of local militias appears to have been instrumental in halting the spread of the LRA to other parts of eastern Uganda, there is a potential risk of precipitating ethnic clashes as three different ethnic groups - that is Acholi, Langi and Iteso - are now well-armed yet there remain historic tensions amongst

them. The ways in which this militarization of society in northern and eastern Uganda has played into an ethnicisation of popular perceptions is increasingly becoming evident²².

E) GOVERNANCE IN CONTEMPORARY UGANDA: BEYOND PEACE-BUILDING TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT/SECURITY?

For Uganda, the future looks too ghastly to contemplate. (Ajulu 2001)

As noted above, the 2001 elections not only confirmed the traditional divide between the south & the north but, perhaps even more critically, opened another internal divide within the NRM. These are very sensitive issues which will require delicate handling if Uganda is to avoid a return to the lawlessness of the 1970s & 1980s more especially now with the impending transition of the country to multi-party politics and the evident calls for a third term by President Museveni come 2006. The wild card in this situation remains the ability of Museveni to control his army after its misdemeanours in the DRC, corruption around procurement & 'ghost' soldiers (Tangri & Mwenda 2001 & 2003) & military control of southern Sudan (Prunier 2004, Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004). In short, approaching mid-decade, Uganda is confronting multiple, interrelated legacies of incomplete transitions, dating back to before independence. So the sustainability of such an 'African renaissance' is problematic unless a judicious balance is maintained among patterns of governance at all levels. In particular, the notion of 'national development' is problematic as recognised already when the 'gap' between, say, Kitgum to Kabale or Mbarara and Gulu is rather wide (Baker 2001, UNDP 2000) as indicated in the continued tensions & violence spreading over two decades, now involving over 20 000 child abductions & over one million internally displaced people, increasingly guarded by army-backed (ethnic?) militia (Erhart & Ayoo 2000, UNDP 2000).

It should be mentioned here that despite apparently agreeing in mid-April to negotiate, the NRM government is still most reluctant to enter any meaningful dialogue let alone talks with the LRA... seemingly maintaining its earlier positions²³...irrespective of the advocacy from a Coalition for Human Rights & Justice Initiatives for Northern Uganda

²¹ See Refugee Law Project 2004 for details.

²² For instance, one district official in Soroti was quoted saying: "...*these Acholis have attacked us and abducted our children... ... we are grateful for the guns that the government has given us because we are going to fight the Acholis till the end*" Chris Dolan (2004) *Militarisation and Its Impacts...A Paper Presented at an International Conference in Kampala in July*.

²³ The NRM government has on many occasions undermined any steps towards a non-military solution to the war in Northern Uganda. The government seems to have insisted on solving the problem through military means with an apparent lack of commitment to non-military solutions. Apart from the infamous move by the top big-wigs in government giving a seven-day ultimatum to the LRA in February 1994... at a time when the then Minister for Pacification of the North was said to be at the verge of brokering a negotiated settlement... there has been a repeated call by the army to fight its way to victory. Furthermore, in early 2000 President Museveni signed a blanket Amnesty passed by the Ugandan Parliament... but at the same time he claimed that he did not believe in it... "We should apply the law of Moses; an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth to bring discipline in society" he instead suggested. (New Vision 21st January 2000)

and related religious & development groups. The Government instead appears to be seeking to augment its image as a staunch ally of the US 'war on terrorism' (Shaw 2004c). However, under pressure from some Northern donors as well as civil society concentrated in the north of the country, President Museveni did agree to an internationally-brokered peace process in mid-2004: a small step towards some form of 'responsibility to protect' (ICISS 2001) or international administration/trusteeship (Berdal & Caplan 2004, Fearon & Laitin 2004)?

In 2003, in the latest incident of CBMs, Uganda did appoint a Presidential Peace Team to dialogue with the rebels, but that came to nought. The LRA declared a unilateral cease-fire in April 2004, but whether it has sufficiently disciplined structures to so effect & maintain is an open question. In July 2004, the government announced that it had a new peace plan – Collaboration for Peace, Reconciliation & Development in northern Uganda (CORD) – involving a US\$2b recovery & development plan. It also formed a new army unit composed of 337 former LRA rebels & captured a leading LRA advisor, Brigadier Kenneth Banya, then number (#) 3 in the LRA hierarchy, who had served in earlier Ugandan armies. Meanwhile the IGAD-sponsored talks in Naivasha about the southern Sudan appeared to be successful, with important implications for the otherwise apparently escalating conflict in the north of Uganda, itself inseparable from the off-on again regional conflicts which have come to characterise the contemporary Horn of Africa (Ajulu 2004).

F) LESSONS FROM/FOR GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The official, optimistic scenario presented by Uganda in the early-21st century in terms of African or HIPC governance – an African democratic development state (Birgsten & Kayazzi-Mugerwa 2001, Holmgren et al 2000) - is that of a continuous negotiation among corporations, donors, NGOs/networks, IBRD, states & partnerships involving new capital/franchises/technologies & commodity/supply chains etc; ie a view reflective of today's 'south' (Shaw 2004b). By contrast, the critical, pessimistic preview suggests arbitrary decision-making, exponential corruption, state violence etc, as reflected in growing concerns re accountability, transparency etc & is articulated by a range of concerned INGOs like Amnesty, ICG, Panos, SCF, World Vision etc; ie another view reflective of the 'north' (Lewis & Wallace 2000, Shaw 2003). If such a division is present – two Ugandas, reflective of two Africas – can one 'national' polity & policy ever be representative & effective? Given Uganda's comeback in the 1990s & setbacks in the new century, are there lessons to be learned for local to global decision-makers (Shaw 2003)?

Here, we look briefly into possible lessons for established disciplines such as political science (PS), international relations (IR) & political economy (PE) as well as for interdisciplinary fields such as African/Development/Security Studies (Abrahamsen 2000, Duffield 2001, Haynes 2003, Lemke 2003, Payne 1999 Shaw 2004d). As suggested at the start of b) above, some of these exist in splendid isolations from each other. In terms of orthodox cannons, case studies like contemporary Uganda suggest the imperative of going beyond the state & formal economy & examining myriad links

between these & the non-state/formal: real triangular forms of mixed actor governance from local to regional levels not just national or global. And in terms of more recent interdisciplinary perspectives, there is a need to reflect on new issues/relations around developing countries & communities, so questions of traditional & 'new' security cannot be separated from the GLR etc (Lemke 2003, Osaghae 2001, Prunier 2004, Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004). Indeed, Uganda in the 21st century (Van Acker 2004) as in the 19th & 20th suggests the imperative of situating 'external' challenges & opportunities in the context of state-society relations...what we now know as 'globalisation' (Dunn & Shaw 2001)? The place of new, poor, small, weak states in a globalizing, let alone turbulent, world is crucial for analysts & citizens alike (Lemke 2003, Shaw 2004a) especially if such states tend to be divided like Uganda.

As Callaghy (2001: 144) concludes in his suggestive study of 'HIPC governance' in Uganda, somewhat parallel to the continent's centrality in anti-landmine & -blood diamond, Ottawa & Kimberley Process, respectively, coalitions:

...Africa has been central to the evolution of the international regime on public debt, although not its primary driving force. New actors & processes have been unleashed in response to Africa's plight that might significantly alter the way the larger development regime functions. In the long run, the most significant changes may well not be HIPC itself, but rather the new processes & transboundary formations that it helped to unleash.

But maybe HIPC governance overlooks spatial (eg the north) & sectoral (eg security, especially the army) limitations of its approach, which the World Bank (2002) has begun to try to rectify through its LICUS initiative & the OECD through renewed advocacy of security sector reform. Yet some of the HIPC/PRSP learning process - how to animate & maintain heterogeneous coalitions (Gariyo 2001 & 2002) - might be transferred to CBMs around the north? For conflict to be contained & development enhanced in the new century, the two halves of Uganda (Africa?) need to be reintegrated. Such a task is very challenging, and can only be contemplated if the complexities of contemporary conflicts & developmentalism are recognised, including their integral regional dimensions. The division of Uganda (Africa?) undermines the possibility & potential of another democratic development state on the continent. Hence the imperative of a conceptual & political leap beyond established & unhelpful assumptions & formulations, for both theory & policy.

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List of Acronyms

ADB	African Development Bank
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index
UNDP	United Development Programme
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
IDPs	Internally Displaced People's Camps
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
UHT	Ultra Heated Treated
GLR	Great Lakes Region
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
UDN	Uganda Debt Network
UN	United Nations
AGOA	African Growth Opportunities Act
UPE	Universal Primary Education
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
NRM	National Resistance Movement
MPs	Members of Parliament
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Draught
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HDI	Human Development Index
MTN	Mobile Telephone Network
MNCs	Multi-National Cooperations
OPM	Office of the Prime-Minister
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Rights Affairs

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August 2004

* This paper reflects research & (formal & informal open-ended) interviews undertaken by the two authors in Gulu & Kampala in mid-2004 as well as in London & Mbarara. It could not have been drafted without inputs & insights from a range of local, national & international individuals & institutions, as reflected in the Bibliography, for which we are grateful. But the usual caveats apply; ie its our own interpretation for which others should not be held responsible!

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